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By now it is well settled that a seller is legally responsible to
those injured as the result of a defect in its product.' This applies
even though the seller did not make the defective product or com-
ponent,' and also extends liability to the manufacturer A lessor
has the same liability.4
A defect may be an isolated specific oversight occurring at the
time of manufacture,' or one which later develops by the very na-
ture of the product's use.' The defect may also be one of design7 or
as a result of failing to warn.' The adequacy of the warning is
judged from the standpoint of the average user.' It is also recogniz-
* Tom Davis is an attorney practicing in Austin, Texas.
Shamrock Fuel & Oil Sales Co. v. Tunks, 416 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. 1967);
McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1967); REsTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 402(A)-(B) (1965).
Ford Motor Co. v. Mathis, 322 F.2d 267 (5th Cir. 1963).
Id.
SBachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 319 (Alas. 1970); United Airlines, Inc. v.
W.E. Johnson Equip. Co., 227 So. 2d 528 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969); Cintrone
v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965);
Stang v. Hertz Corp., 83 N.M. 730, 497 P.2d 732 (1972).
'Putman v. Erie City Mfg. Co., 338 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1964).
Nevels v. Ford Motor Co., 439 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1971); Sharp v. Chrysler
Corp., 432 S.W.2d 131 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), writ ref'd n.r.e.
7 Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 411 F.2d 451 (2d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 959 (1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 829 (1970); Olsen
v. Royal Metals Corp., 392 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1968); Swain v. Boeing Air-
plane Co., 337 F.2d 940 (2d Cir. 1964); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods.,
Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963); Garcia v. Sky
Climber, Inc., 470 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971), no writ hist.; Pizza Inn,
Inc. v. Tiffany, 454 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970), no writ hist.
' Alman Bros. Farms & Feed Mill, Inc. v. Diamond Lab. Inc., 437 F.2d 1295
(5th Cir. 1971); Doss v. Apache Powder Co., 430 F.2d 1317 (5th Cir. 1970);
Technical Chem. Co. v. Jacobs, 480 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. 1972); Garcia v. Sky
Climber, Inc., 470 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971), no writ hist.
9 Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 219 Pa. Super. 479, 281 A.2d 707
(1971).
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ed that the duty of the manufacturer is continuing,'" so as to re-
quire additional warnings of those products already in use in which
defects develop. It is also well recognized that where a product
fails, it is not necessary that the specific defect causing the failure
be established," in that the defect may be established by circum-
stantial evidence.'2
Much has also been written concerning the legal duty of an
automobile manufacturer in "crash-worthiness" or "second col-
lision" cases. 3 While the growing majority' favors the rule that
the manufacturer is under a legal duty in the design of the product
to foresee or anticipate that the product may be involved in a col-
lision and therefore take precautions for the protection of the occu-
pants, there is authority to the contrary.'5
10 Braniff Airways v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 411 F.2d 451 (2d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 959 (1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 829 (1970); Noel v.
United Aircraft Corp., 342 F.2d 232 (3d Cir. 1964).
" Alman Bros. Farms & Feed Mills, Inc. v. Diamond Lab, Inc., 437 F.2d
1295 (5th Cir. 1971); Chestnut v. Ford Motor Co., 445 F.2d 967 (4th Cir.
1971); Kridler v. Ford Motor Co., 422 F.2d 1182 (3d Cir. 1970).
"Franks v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 414 F.2d 682 (5th Cir. 1969);
American Motors Corp. v. Mosier, 414 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1969); Pittsburg Coca-
Cola Bottling Works v. Ponder, 443 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. 1969); Darryl v. Ford
Motor Co., 440 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. 1969).
"See, e.g., Hoenig & Werber, Automobile Crashworthiness: An Untenable
Doctrine, 1971 INs. L.J. 583; Nader & Page, Automobile Design & the Judicial
Process, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 645 (1967); Note, 52 IOWA L. REV. 953 (1967);
Note, 24 VAND. L. REV. 862, 864 (1971).
'4Driesenstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1974);
Passwaters v. General Motors Corp., 454 F.2d 1270 (8th Cir. 1972); Larsen v.
General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968) (applying Michigan law
by stipulation of parties); Bremier v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 340 F. Supp.
949 (D.D.C. 1972); Grundmanis v. British Motor Corp., 308 F. Supp. 303 (E.D.
Wis. 1970); Dyson v. General Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. Pa.
1969); Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 433 (1972); Badorek v. General Motors Corp., 11 Cal. App. 3d 902, 90
Cal. Rptr. 305 (1970); Friend v. General Motors Corp., 118 Ga. App. 763, 165
S.E.2d 734 (1968), cert. dismissed, 225 Ga. 290, 167 S.E.2d 926 (1969); Miehr
v. Brown, 3 Ill. App. 3d 802, 278 N.E.2d 869 (1972), rev'd, 54 Ill. 2d 539,
301 N.E.2d 307 (1973); Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.,
513 P.2d 268 (Mont. 1973); Bolm v. Triumph Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 151, 305
N.E.2d 769, 350 N.Y.S.2d 644 (1973); Storey v. Exhaust Specialties & Parts,
Inc., 255 Ore. 151, 464 P.2d 831 (1970); Mickle v. Blackmon, 252 S.C. 202,
155 S.E.2d 173 (1969); Engberg v. Ford Motor Co., - S.D. -, 205 N.W.2d
104 (1973); Ellithrop v. Ford Motor Co., 503 S.W.2d 516 (Tenn. 1973); 2
CCH 1974 PROD. LIAB. REP. 5 7092.
" Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966); Alexander
v. Seaboard Air Lines R.R. Co., 346 F. Supp. 320 (W.D. N.C. 1971); McClung
v. Ford Motor Co., 333 F. Supp. 17 (S.D.W.Va. 1971), aft'd, 472 F.2d 240
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Without rehashing the philosophy of these two lines of cases, it
is submitted that they are of academic interest only when consider-
ing the law of product liability in the aviation field. While automo-
bile manufacturers may not have given consideration to the surviv-
ability of the occupants of its vehicles, this is not true of the avia-
tion industry."8
This recognition makes applicable the universal rule that even
though the law may not place a duty upon a defendant in the first
instance, if that defendant voluntarily assumes such duty, then it
is legally responsible for the breach thereof. Most will recall from
law school the case of the railroad that was held responsible for the
negligence of the flagman it voluntarily placed at a crossing."'
Since aircraft manufacturers have taken steps toward protecting
occupants from the consequences of a crash, they have in fact vol-
untarily assumed this duty. Having voluntarily assumed the duty
to anticipate the effect of a crash upon an occupant, the aircraft
manufacturer, like the railroad in Wright, is in no position to con-
tend that it was under no such legal duty in its design considera-
tions and therefore is not responsible for its breach.
Nor could the aircraft manufacturer successfully argue that it
could limit the scope of this duty to the specific area which it con-
sidered, such as seat belts or shoulder harnesses, and thus escape
liability in other areas, like post impact fuel fire or use of impact
absorbing structures and materials, any more than the railroad in
a situation like Wright could have escaped liability to a motorist
had it provided a flagman to warn pedestrians only.
In similar fashion, the courts have refused to allow the Federal
Aviation Administration to limit the scope of its liability to those
duties specifically defined in its various operational manuals once
its general duties have been established or recognized. 8
(4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 940 (1973); Schumard v. General Motors
Corp., 270 F. Supp. 311 (S.D. Ohio 1967); Willis v. Chrysler Corp., 264 F.
Supp. 1010 (S.D. Tex. 1967); Burkhard v. Short, 28 Ohio App. 2d 141, 275
N.E.2d 632 (1971).
18 "One of the responsibilities of designers and manufacturer of aircraft is
to design, to the best of their ability, crashworthiness into aircraft. We are all
aware of this responsibility .. " Boedel, Methods of Crashworthiness Testing
for Aircraft Design, SOCIETY OF AUTOMOBILE ENGINEERS 720323 (Mar. 1972).
17Chicago & A. Ry. Co. v. Wright, 120 Ill. App. 218 (1905).
"SHartz v. United States, 387 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1968); Furumizo v. United
States, 381 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1967); Ingham v. Eastern Air Lines, 373 F.2d
227 (2d Cir. 1967).
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One area of products liability in which there are few decided
cases and in which little has been written is the liability growing
out of inspection, maintenance, repair or overhaul of aircraft and
components. While the term "products liability" includes both neg-
ligence and strict liability in tort, an attempt will be made to sep-
arate these two concepts, though this has not always been the re-
sult in the reported decisions and in some instances it is difficult,
if not impossible, to avoid overlapping in some of the gray areas.
A. Vicarious Liability of Repair Stations
Another area of growing interest is the liability of a general
repair shop for the negligent or defective workmanship performed
by an independent specialty shop to which the repair shop sublet a
portion of the work it contracted to do with the aircraft owner.
This would include both repair and overhaul of various compon-
ents and may or may not be involved with a required periodic in-
spection. Also included in our consideration should be the effect
of the certification of airworthiness required by Part 43 of the
Federal Air Regulations in connection with an annual or other
periodic inspection. 9
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 429 (1965) states an
exception to the general rule that an employer is immune from lia-
bility for the negligence of his independent contractor, in the fol-
lowing formulation:
One who employs an independent contractor to perform services
for another which are accepted in the reasonable belief that the
services are being rendered by the employer or by his servants, is
subject to liability for physical harm caused by the negligence of
the contractor in supplying such services, to the same extent as
though the employer were supplying them himself or by his serv-
ants."0
The underlying policy of this rule is clear: when an individual
contracts for work to be done by a certain organization, he pre-
sumably does so on the basis of his knowledge of the organization's
competence. Additionally, he may have considered the organiza-
" For a detailed review of the Federal Aviation Administration's liability in
this area, see Riddell, Federal Tort Claims Act-Governmental Liability For
Negligent Chart Publication and Aircraft Certification, 19 WAYNE L. REV. 1201
(1973).
2 0 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 429 (1965).
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tion's solvency and ability to make right any wrongs which it may
commit. If that organization then sublets part of the work contract-
ed for, the customer has been deprived of some of these considera-
tions. He may or may not have knowledge about the confidence in
the subcontractor's competence or solvency. If the subcontractor's
work causes harm or loss, the obligation to compensate should not
only be upon the subcontractor but also upon the organization
which selected him.
The theory outlined above was followed by the court in Russell's
Express v. Bray's Garage," where the defendant agreed to do gen-
eral repair work on plaintiff's automobile, but informed plaintiff
that welding would be done by another party. Later plaintiff was
injured as a result of the welder's negligence. The defendant sought
to escape liability on the ground that it was not responsible for
the welding, but the court refused that argument, holding:
It appears that defendant conducted a general repair garage. It
did not do welding, but had what it believed a competent welder,
to whom welding jobs were turned over. When a garage takes a
repair job, and the contrary does not appear, so far as the custo-
mer is concerned, it undertakes for itself the whole job. Whether
the garage does all the work is quite immaterial. Should the job
require work to be done outside the capacity of its shop .... the
garage gets the work done on its own account, being equally re-
sponsible to the customer whether the work is done by its imme-
diate employees or by specialists in the different lines of work re-
quired to be done."
This rule was also followed in Zevon v. Tennebaum, and Irri-
anne v. Diamond T. of Hudson County, Inc. "
Strict liability in tort for defects in repairs or overhaul can be
supported by the doctrine of "implied warranty of workmanlike
service."
B. An Implied Warranty of Workmanlike Service
The theory of an implied warranty of workmanlike service is
illustrated in three Supreme Court decisions: Ryan Stevedoring
2194 Conn. 520, 109 A. 722 (1920).
22 Id. at -, 109 A. at 723.
2273 Ariz. 281, 240 P.2d 548 (1952).
2494 N.J. Super. 148, 227 A.2d 335 (1967). See also 7-A D. BLASHFIELD,
CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW & PRACTICE 5029 (1950).
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Company v. Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corp.,' Crumady v. The J.
H. Fisser and Italia Societa v. Oregon Stevedoring Co.' While
all three cases involved actions by a shipowner to recover indem-
nity from a stevedoring contractor, where the contractor's em-
ployee has recovered judgment against the shipowner on the basis
of unseaworthiness, there is no reason why this same principle
would not apply to other similar situations such as aircraft repair
or overhaul. 8
In Ryan, a stevedoring contractor agreed to perform all steve-
doring operations required by the shipowner, without signing a
formal stevedoring contract or an express indemnity agreement.
Under the agreement, the contractor loaded a ship at Georgetown,
S.C., and unloaded it at a pier in Brooklyn. During the unloading,
a longshoreman employed by the contractor was injured by a roll
of pulpboard which had been insufficiently secured when stored
by the contractor in Georgetown. Under the Longshoreman's Act,
the contractor's insurance carrier paid the longshoreman compen-
sation and furnished him medical services. Claiming that because
of the unsafe stowage of the cargo, the ship was unseaworthy and
that the shipowner had failed to furnish him with a safe place to
work, the longshoreman sued the shipowner and obtained a judg-
ment for $75,000.00. The shipowner then brought suit against
the contractor for reimbursement of that amount paid to the long-
shoreman as a result of the $75,000.00 judgment.
In framing the issue the Court spoke in terms of contract:
The . . . question is whether, in the absence of an express agree-
ment of indemnity, a stevedoring contractor is obligated to reim-
burse a shipowner for damages caused it by the contractor's im-
proper stowage of cargo.29
Because respondent [shipowner] ... relies entirely upon petitioner's
- 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
26358 U.S. 423 (1959).
27376 U.S. 315 (1964). The remedy provided by these cases, while still
sound law, has now become meaningless, since by recent amendment to the
Longshoremen and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act, a longshoreman no
longer has a cause of action against the vessel owner for unseaworthiness.
2 Likewise, if "one who is an independent contractor negligently makes, re-
builds, or repairs a chattel for another is subject to the same liability as that
imposed upon negligent manufacturers of chattels, "S.H. Kress & Co. v. God-
man, 95 Idaho 614, 515 P.2d 561 (1973), he should also be imposed with the
same liability as a non-negligent (strict liability in tort) manufacturer.
29350 U.S. at 132 (emphasis deleted).
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contractural obligation, we do not meet the question of a noncon-
tractual right of indemnity .... 0
Similarly, in discussing the issue the Court indicated that negli-
gence played no part in the shipowner's theory of recovery.
The shipowner here holds the petitioner's uncontroverted agree-
ment to perform all of the shipowner's stevedoring operations....
Competency and safety of stowage are inescapable elements of the
service undertaken. This obligation is not a quasicontractual obli-
gation implied in law or arising out of a noncontractual relation-
ship. It is of the essence of petitioner's stevedoring contract. It is
petitioner's warranty of workmanlike service that is comparable to
a manufacturer's warranty of the soundness of its manufactured
product."
Likewise, contributory negligence of the shipowner was not a
defense since the recovery was for breach of the implied warranty.
The contractor had asserted that because the shipowner had an
obligation to supervise the stowage and reject unsafe cargo, it
should be barred from recovery because of its failure to discover
the improper stowage. The Court rejected this contention, stating
that:
...the contractor, as the warrantor of its own services, cannot
use the shipowner's failure to discover and correct the contractor's
own breach of warranty as a defense."
In the Crumady case, the petitioner was injured while working
for a stevedoring company engaged in unloading a ship under con-
tract with a third party to whom the ship had been chartered. Pe-
titioner brought this suit in admiralty against the ship, which im-
pleaded the stevedoring company. The petitioner longshoreman
had been injured by a winch which had been adjusted by fellow
employees of the stevedoring company "in a way that made it
unsafe and dangerous for the work at hand."" Since the negligence
of petitioner's fellow employees was established, the court spoke
in terms of negligence as being the breach of the implied warranty
of workmanlike service:




358 U.S. at 427.
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Ryan case. The warranty which a stevedore owes when he goes
aboard a vessel to perform services is plainly for the benefit of the
vessel whether the vessel's owners are parties to the contract or
not. That is enough to bring the vessel into the zone of modem
law that recognizes rights in third-party beneficiaries. Restatement,
Law of Contracts, § 133. Moreover, as we said in the Ryan case,
"competency and safety of stowage are inescapable elements of the
service undertaken." 350 U.S., at 133. They are part of the steve-
dore's "warranty of workmanlike service that is comparable to a
manufacturer's warranty of the soundness of its manufactured
product." Id., at 133-134. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,
217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050.
We conclude that since the negligence of the stevedores, which
brought the unseaworthiness of the vessel into play, amounted to
a breach of the warranty of workmanlike service, the vessel may
recover over."
Italia Societa per Azioni di Navigatione v. Oregon Stevedoring
Co., Inc.,' leaves no doubt that this doctrine also applies in non-
negligence situations. There, the stevedoring contractor unknowing-
ly supplied defective equipment (a rope designed to withstand
substantially more pressure than was exerted on it) to its em-
ployees. The injured longshoreman recovered a judgment against
the ship for unseaworthiness and the ship in turn sued the steve-
doring contractor for indemnity. Both the District Court and Ninth
Circuit disallowed indemnity on the basis that "a stevedore's im-
plied warranty of workmanlike service is not breached in the ab-
sence of a showing of negligence in supplying defective equip-
ment. 310 F.2d 481 (9th Cir. 1962).""
The Supreme Court rejected this reasoning, finding that negli-
gence was not a necessary element of the basis for recovery:
For the reasons stated below, we have determined that the ab-
sence of negligence on the part of a stevedore who furnishes de-
fective equipment is not fatal to the shipowner's claim of indem-
nity based on the stevedore's implied warranty of workmanlike
service.
In Ryan v. Pan-Atlantic Corp., 350 U.S. 124, the landmark de-
cision in this area, it was established that a stevedoring contractor
who enters into a service agreement with a shipowner is liable to
indemnify the owner for damages sustained as a result of the steve-
3ld. at 428-29.
- 376 U.S. 315 (1964).
"Id. at 318 (emphasis added).
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dore's improper stowage of cargo. Although the agreement be-
tween the shipowner and stevedore was silent on the subject of
warranties and standards of performance, the Court found that the
essence of the stevedore's contract is to perform "properly and
safely." Competency and safety . . . are inescapable elements of
the service undertaken. This undertaking is the stevedore's "war-
ranty of workmanlike service that is comparable to a manufactur-
er's warranty of the soundness of its manufactured product," 350
U.S., at 133-134, a warranty generally deemed to cover defects
not attributable to a manufacturer's negligence. See also Crumady
v. The J. H. Fisser, 358 U.S. 423, 428-429."'
The court also outlined the policy reasons for imposing this lia-
bility and drew a direct analogy between those providing "work-
manlike services" and a seller or manufacturer of a product:
And the description of the stevedore's obligation as one of per-
formance with reasonable safety is not a reference to the reason-
able-man test pertaining to negligence, but a delineation of the
scope of the stevedore's implied contractual duties. The implied
warranty to supply reasonably safe equipment may be satisfied
with less than absolutely perfect equipment; however, the issue
of breach of the undertaking does not turn on whether the con-
tractor knew or should have known that his equipment was safe,
but on whether the equipment was in fact safe and fit for its in-
tended use....
True the defect here was latent and the stevedore free of negli-
gent conduct in supplying the rope. But latent defects may be at-
tributable to improper manufacture or fatigue due to long use and
may be discoverable by subjecting the equipment to appropriate
tests. Further the stevedore company, which brings its gear on
board knows the history of its prior use and is in a position to
establish retirement schedules and periodic retests so as to dis-
cover defects and thereby insure safety of operations. . . . It is
considerations such as these that underlie a manufacturer's or
seller's obligation to supply products free of defects and a ship-
owner's obligation to furnish a seaworthy vessel. They also serve to
render a tort standard of negligence inapplicable to the stevedore's
liability under its warranty of workmanlike service. For they il-
lustrate that liability should fall upon the party best situated to
adopt preventive measures and thereby to reduce the likelihood of
injury. Where, as here, injury-producing and defective equipment
is under the supervision and control of the stevedore, the shipown-
er is powerless to minimize the risk; the stevedore is not.8
37 Id. at 318-19.
38Id. at 321-24.
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While no good reason appears why this doctrine should not be
applied to situations involving aircraft repairs, the only reported
case in which an attempt was made to hold an aircraft repair shop
"strictly liable in tort" was not successful. In Raritan Trucking
Corp. v. Aero Commander, Inc.,"s the plaintiff took possession of
an aircraft in October, 1962. On September 13, 1963, the manu-
facturer issued a service bulletin to correct a possible landing gear
strut extension which could prevent the landing gear from locking
in an "up" position. The court said:
Part I of the bulletin called for inspection of the strut within the
next 25 hours' flight time, while Part II of the bulletin specified
modifications to prevent future strut overextension....
On October 16, 1963, Continental [the servicer of the aircraft]
performed Part I . . . and found no over-extension. After this
inspection the plane was flown for about 16 hours and made 15
landings with no noted difficulty. On October 25 Continental un-
dertook the modifications required by Part II of the Service Bulle-
tin, and on the very next flight two days later the crash occurred.'
At the time of the crash the plane had approximately 275 hours
total flying time.
Although allowing the plaintiffs to proceed on a negligence
theory, the court affirmed a directed verdict against plaintiffs'
theory of strict liability in tort since ". . . no New Jersey case has
extended the strict liability theory to a case in which there have
been no goods or other property supplied" and the court did not
"think that the New Jersey courts would extend strict liability to
this case. '" 1 The court did, however, recognize that many of the
same policy considerations supporting strict liability in sale cases
were also present under the facts of this case:
Here we have a similar risk of harm to Raritan, its employees,
passengers, and members of the public from the operation of a
plane with inoperable landing gear. In turning the plane over to
Raritan after repairing it, Continental necessarily represented that
the landing gear remained in proper operating condition. And
Raritan's reliance was, of necessity, great. Raritan had neither
adequate knowledge nor sufficient opportunity to determine if the
work on the landing gear had left it in proper operating condition,
39458 F.2d 1106 (3d Cir. 1972).
40Id. at 1109.4 1 1d. at 1113.
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and thus had to rely upon the skill, care, and reputation of Con-
tinental.42
Even though these similar elements were present, the court was
* . convinced that the application of strict liability by the New
Jersey courts in this case cannot be predicted with great assur-
ance.
'4M
What the result of this case may have been if the doctrine of
"implied warranty for workmanlike service" had been presented
to the court, or if the court had felt justified in making the initial
discussion itself without some indication from the New Jersey
courts, is only speculative. As distinguished from repairs, an over-
haul more closely resembles the manufacture of a new product and
there is authority to support strict liability in this situation."
However, there is yet another factor peculiar to aviation that
has neither existed nor been discussed in any reported case, the
written certification or representation of airworthiness by a re-
pairman in compliance with the requirements of the Federal Air
Regulations for a one hundred hour or annual inspection.
C. An Express Warranty of Airworthiness
§ 91.69 provides that "no person may operate an aircraft un-
less, within the preceding twelve calendar months, it has had-( 1)
An annual inspection in accordance with Part 43 of this chapter
and has been approved for return to service by a person authorized
by § 43.7 of this chapter. . . ." This Section further provides that
aircraft carrying persons for hire or used for flight instructions for
hire must also receive a one hundred hour inspection.
§ 43.7 provides in part:
The holder of a mechanic certificate or an inspection authoriza-
tion may approve an aircraft, air frame, aircraft engine, propeller,
or appliance for return to service as provided in Part 65 of this
chapter.
In turn, § § 65.81, 65.85 and 65.87 provide that a certified me-
chanic may return to service or "sign off" an aircraft or component
part in connection with a one hundred hour inspection and § 65.95
421d. at 1114.
43 Id.
4In Craig v. Burch, 228 So. 2d 723 (La. App. 1969), a defendant who had
recapped a tire was held strictly liable to a car owner and a passenger.
19741
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provides that the holder of an inspection authorization may "sign
off" the work performed on an aircraft or component in connec-
tion with an annual inspection.
§ 43.11 then provides in part that if the aircraft or component
is returned to service following an annual or one hundred hour
inspection, the repairman must certify in writing in the mainten-
ance record of the equipment being returned to service as follows:
"I certify that this aircraft has been inspected in accordance with
(insert type) inspection and was determined to be in airworthy
condition."
What effect this certification would have on the liability of the
certifying repairman has not yet been determined. However, it
could reasonably be argued that the certification is an express
warranty of airworthiness imposing strict liability upon the certify-
ing repairman. Certainly this concept should strengthen the argu-
ments that could be advanced concerning the "implied warranty
of workmanlike service" discussed earlier.
As can be seen, there remains a vast, unplowed and perhaps
fertile field of potential liability in negligence and strict liability,
both directly and vicariously, against the segments of the aviation
industry involved in the inspection, maintenance, repair and over-
haul of aircraft and their various components.
